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1 Unified accounts of anaphora and presupposition
The goal of this paper is to present a simple and novel system for capturing core data about
anaphora and presupposition projection. With respect to presupposition there is no novelty:
I simply use a variant of the strong Kleene trivalent logic to treat presupposition projection.1
What is new is that I add some apparatus from dynamic semantics to extend the trivalent
system to also cover e-type anaphora.
Heim, in her dissertation [1982], gave two treatments of e-type (donkey) anaphora. One
(chapter 2) treated anaphora by means of explicit existential quantifiers in a fully static (and
very standard) semantic framework, the other (chapter 3) introduced the first compositional
dynamic semantics for anaphora. One of Heim’s main arguments for adopting the second
approach was that her dynamic system provided a unified treatment of anaphora and presup-
position, something no other account provided. Heim’s account of anaphora and presupposition
has been modified and extended by, among others, Beaver [2001] into a unified and powerful
system for the treatment of both.2
The dynamic treatment of presupposition projection has been criticized by Schlenker [2008,
2009] for its lack of explanatoriness. However, alternative treatments of presupposition pro-
jection such as Schlenker’s local context approach and the trivalent approach do not obviously
integrate well with an account of e-type anaphora.3 In later work, Heim [1990] suggests in-
tegrating a static (presumably trivalent) presuppositional approach to definites with situation
semantics and an e-type treatment of pronouns as disguised Fregean descriptions to cover don-
key anaphora, a treatment elaborated in Elbourne [2005]. This paper is not the occasion for a
full discussion of these semantic theories, but I will pause to note the following:
• Unlike standard dynamic accounts, these proposals have rarely, if ever, been spelled out
in large fragments containing sentential connectives and negation.4
• The proposals contain complex definitions of quantifiers such as peveryq with multiple
layers of existential and universal quantification over individuals and situations (a property
shared by most dynamic approaches but not by the account I present here).
∗I am indebted to Matt Mandelkern for extensive discussion.
1It is my view that, when the dust has settles, this remains the simplest viable treatment of presupposition
projection on the market. See Peters [1979], Krahmer [1998], George [2007], Fox [2008, 2012] among others.
2A different tradition stemming from van der Sandt [1992] uses and Kamp’s DRT to unify anaphora and
presupposition. Beaver, to my mind, makes convincing arguments against this approach.
3I use e-type anaphora as a term to describe the general phenomenon in which pronouns are used without c-
commanded antecedents, the relation between pronoun and antecedent being inter-sentential, across conditionals,
or between the restrictor and matrix of an NP. An e-type treatment, by contrast, is a semantic account of such
pronouns which treats them as akin to defined descriptions that have Russellian/Fregean semantics [such as,
Cooper, 1979, Evans, 1977].
4For example the fragment in Elbourne [2005]—often pointed to as one of the most extensive situation-
theoretic-cum-descriptive treatments of donkey anaphora—does not contain a semantics for negation, and it is
non-trivial to see how one can be added.
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• The connections between e-type anaphora and presupposition projection are rarely made
explicit in this tradition.
For these and other reasons I do not see the situation-theoretic e-type approach as a particularly
promising line for an integrated account of e-type anaphora and presupposition.
As I see the current situation, then, dynamic approaches provide the best unified accounts of
presupposition and anaphora. So why should we bother rethinking the framework of dynamic
semantics when it is so successful in this respect? Shouldn’t we just accept its successes and
move on, either just replacing it or expanding it, rather than tweaking? Here I stand with Dekker
and Schlenker, in particular, who have suggested that the successes of dynamic semantics may
not adequately motivate its foundational ideas.
For instance, a salient feature of standard dynamics semantics is to treat the semantic
values of sentences not as truth-conditions but rather as context change potentials (CCPS).5
In other words, instead of having semantic values be functions from points of a context to
truth-values, semantic values are functions from contexts (sets of points) to contexts.6 There
are many obviously inexpressible such functions: for example, we do not have a sentences in any
language that expresses the context change that moves any context to one which only accepts
the fact that there are pink elephants. There are no knock-down considerations in favor of
having lower-type semantic values, but lower types are simpler and, thus, all else equal to be
preferred.
All else is never equal, though, and type-theoretical considerations are not my only ones.
Another way in which my semantics is simpler is that the definitions of the quantifiers and
connectives I use are essentially their classical definitions: the dynamic effects of these really
do follow from their classical definitions (and the strong Kleene logic). Thus, I share the
motivations for Schlenker’s non-dynamic account of presupposition projection which relies on
a classical understanding of connectives and quantifiers. This, again, adds to the simplicity
of the semantic system and relatedly its learnability. More significant, perhaps, are empirical
advantages: I handle the behavior of anaphora under double negation and through disjunctions
in a straightforward way, something dynamic accounts tend to struggle with.7
My account is in the spirit of the constructive criticisms of dynamic semantics put forward
by Dekker [1994, 2012] and Schlenker [2008, 2009]. The account is similar to Dekker’s Predicate
Logic with Anaphora (and is directly inspired by it), in that it also uses many of the conceptual
innovations of dynamic semantics without resorting to a context change potential-based seman-
tics. On the other hand, the account is parallel to Schlenker’s static accounts of presupposition
(transparency theory and his local context theory) in that it uses more standard, non-stipulative
definitions of all quantifiers and connectives, including conjunction. From a broader perspective,
while Dekker treats e-type anaphora but not presuppositon, and Schlenker treats presupposition
but not e-type anaphora, I try to treat both.
5Or in extensional fragments such as Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991] as functions from assignment functions
to assignment functions rather than assignment functions to truth values.
6I am assuming here that contexts are sets whose elements I call points, these points can be worlds as in
Stalnaker’s framework or world-assignment function pairs as in many dynamic accounts.
7In some aspects of this, I follow Krahmer [1998], except that Krahmer combines DRT with trivalence,
rather than simply having a trivalent system and he does not cover all the aspects of disjunction that I do.
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2 Some rules of the game
We will adopt a Heimian notion of context according to which a context is a set of pairs of
assignment functions and worlds.8 This conception, of course, does not commit us to higher-
type semantic values, just the (fairly) uncontroversial idea that speaker and hearers keep track
of possible discourse references for certain ‘variables’ introduced in discourse.9
Truth conditions—certain forms of irrelevant context-sensitivity aside—are simply functions
from elements of such contexts (pairs of assignment functions and worlds) to truth values. Our
semantics will be static or truth-conditional in that the semantic value of sentences will be such
truth-conditions.10
The update rule associated with a sentence φ will be Stalnakerian [Stalnaker, 1970, Roth-
schild and Yalcin, 2015]. When a sentence φ is asserted in a context c we remove from c every
element on which φ is not true.11
3 E-type pronouns and presuppositions
The following examples illustrate a small part of the connection between presupposition pro-
jection and e-type anaphoric relations.
(1) a. John used to smoke and he hasn’t stopped smoking.
b. ?John hasn’t stopped smoking and he used to smoke.
c. ?John didn’t used to smoke and he hasn’t stopped smoking.
(2) a. A man walked in and he wasn’t wearing a hat.
b. ?He wasn’t wearing a hat and a man walked in.
c. ?A man didn’t walk in and he was wearing a hat.
It is worth sketching an aspect of the empirical connection between presupposition and
anaphora. Consider a case where we have a complex sentence s with constituents φ and ψ
such that φ presupposes X and ψ classically entails X. For example in (1-a), φ = phe hasn’t
stopped smokingq, ψ = phe used to smokeq and X = phe used to smoke.q If s does not itself
presuppose X, and this is because of ψ, then we’ll say that ψ allows for local satisfaction of
the presupposition of φ (it filters it out). This is the case in (1-a). Very roughly speaking,
the same configurations that allow for local satisfaction of presuppositions also allow for e-type
anaphora. This is what is illustrated by the examples above.
8This is also the approach explored inter alia in Groenendijk et al. [1996]: context includes information
about variable assignments, not just worlds
9This is in the spirit of Lewis [1983] and even seems to be countenanced in an unsystematic pragmatic way
by Stalnaker [1998]. Note that this notion can lead to a flavor of discourse dynamism within a completely static
semantic system as discussed by Rothschild and Yalcin [2016, §5].
10It is important to distinguish this kind of static compositional semantics from what Rothschild and Yalcin
[2015] call dynamics at the conversational level. That is, the CCPs associated with assertion in our seman-
tic/pragmatic whole may be dynamic in various senses, but the sentences themselves are static in that they are
not functions from contexts to contexts but rather simply truth assignments for individual points.
11Of course, the effect of this update rule will not always be what Stalnaker had in mind in the classic papers
where he suggests these updates since the context includes not just worlds but also assignment functions. I
share with the dynamic tradition a lack of interest in the question of whether sentences express propositions.
Since contexts are not just sets of worlds we cannot simply identify the semantic value of a sentence with the set
of worlds it is true in. But for reasons addressed already in Lewis [1980] that is not generally viable in semantic
theorizing. Certainly we can define various different notions of content in contexts, but we need not take a stand
on these.
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Given this connection between local satisfaction of presupposition and e-type anaphora we
might expect a theoretical connection. Our account, like the dynamic account stemming from
Heim [1982], tries to make good on that expectation.
4 A trivalent account of presupposition
Let me give a brief outline of how the facts about presupposition projection can be accounted
for on a trivalent framework. On a trivalent semantics, sentences can be either true, false, or
undefined (1,0, or #). The connectives handle undefinedness according to the strong Kleene
truth tables, the guiding principle of which is to give truth values when those are determined
by what is defined. We can also add order effects, more closely matching standard theories of
presupposition projection by using Peter’s truth tables [Peters, 1979, Krahmer, 1998, George,
2007].
The relationship between the trivalent truth tables and context is important here. A sentence
φ is acceptable in a context c iff φ is true or false at every element of c. This, sometimes
called Stalnaker’s principle, was proposed by him as an intuitive principle, but has since been
recognized to be rather a kind of stipulation [for discussion, see Soames, 1989, Rothschild,
2008b, Fox, 2012].
To give an example, let us treat pJohn stopped smokingq as undefined if John didn’t use to
smoke and true or false otherwise. Then, given the strong Kleene understanding of conjunction,
(1-a) will be defined in any context. This is because when the presupposition of the second
conjunct is not satisfied the first conjunct is false and so the entire sentence is undefined.
5 E-type Anaphora and Content
What has been called the problem of the formal link [Heim, 1990] puts a particularly sharp
constraint on how we treat anaphoric connections. Here are types of examples due to Partee
and Heim respectively:
(3) a. ? Nine of the ten marbles are on the floor. . . . ? It’s on the couch.
b. One of the ten marbles is not on the table. . . . It’s on the couch.
(4) a. ? Every married man loves her.
b. Every man with a wife loves her.
The lesson here is that pronouns without appropriately marked NP antecedents are difficult,
and often result in infelicity. This suggests that if we are to use a presuppositional approach
we cannot rely on simply presuppositions about the state of the world. Rather we also need
presuppositions that somehow involve variables.12
12The modern e-type treatment of anaphora rather attempts to cover such facts by positing syntactic con-
ditions on the licensing of covert descriptions, such as Elbourne’s [2005] NP-deletion. My view is that such
conditions face serious challenges as they separate the syntactic licensing conditions from the semantics of the
pronouns and will inevitable make bad predictions. Here is one example:
(i) ?Everyone who doesn’t have a home but knows a home-owner, stays in it.
(ii) Every who isn’t a home-owner but knows someone who has a home, stays in it.
The problem is that it would seem that pa homeq in (i) should license the description pthe homeq whose
presupposition is then satisfied by restrictor state.
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6 Anaphoric presuppositions: intersentential case
Let’s focus for a moment on the inter -sentential case, such as (3-a) and (3-b). The question is
how the context differs between these two examples to make the assertions different: that is,
what effect does the first sentence have on the context to make the pronoun in the second sen-
tence felicitous. Let us assume, as in the Heim’s approach, that pronouns are simply variables.
What we need to explain the contrasts in the section above is to posit special constraints on
the use of variables. For example, Heim puts a familiarity presupposition on the use of definite
variables—a special structural condition on the local context of a pronoun. In this section
I outline a related approach that fits more naturally with a standard trivalent treatment of
presuppositions.
I will assume something like the partiality of assignment functions, though in a slightly non-
standard way. What I will assume is that assignment functions are functions from variables onto
the usual domain D as well as an absurd object ⊥. Empty contexts include all assignments.13
The presupposition of the use of a definite variable x is simply that x does not refer to ⊥.
To get this to work we need the harmless assumption that the extension of every predicate is
undefined when applied to ⊥.
What about our treatment of indefinites? How do they ensure that intersentential anaphora
works? Nothing special is needed, except assuming, as Heim does, that indefinites put con-
straints on variables rather than having existential force in the usual sense. pOne marblex is
not on the tableq is true at 〈f, w〉 iff f(x) is a man who walked in at w. Any context on which
it is true at every point, thus, will make pitx’s on the couchq defined.
Let’s go through a simple example with truth conditions spelled out:
JA manx walked in.Kf,w = {1 iff f(x) is a man who walked in in w
0 otherwise
JHex had a drinkKf,w =

# if f(x) = ⊥
1 if f(x) had a drink in w
0 otherwise
The point is that once the context absorbs the first sentence, then the second sentence is
guaranteed to be acceptable since all the points at which f(x) = ⊥ have been eliminated. In
terms of truth-conditions, this theory so far matches Heim: indefinites have existential force
given that the empty assignment allow all possible assignments.14
7 Conjunction
The story for inter-sentential anaphora extends to a treatment of e-type anaphora across a
conjunction:
(5) A manx walked in and hex ordered a drink.
At any point in the context in which x is assigned ⊥ the sentence is false on the strong Kleene
understanding of conjunction since the first conjunct is false.15 If we wish to explain why the
13On the standard use of partial assignment functions in dynamic semantics the empty assignment is that in
which no variable has a defined assignment, not one in which every possible assignment (including empty/absurd
ones) is in the context.
14While we have not yet put any condition on the use of indefinites, we might assume that indefinite should
not be reused because of some variation of a maximize presupposition rule [Heim, 1991].
15See the appendix for details including the strong Kleene conjunction.
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reverse order, as in (6), is infelicitous will need to use the Peters [1979] version of the connectives
or apply an order constraint.
(6) ?Hex ordered a drink and a manx walked in.
8 Taking stock
Let us take stock of where we are so far. Here are the salient features of the semantics and
pragmatic that have posited so far: a) Heim’s basic understanding of context as sets of pairs
of worlds and assignment functions, b) a particular type of assignment functions that includes
absurd objects, c) a variable-based semantics for both indefinites and pronouns, d) a trivalent
logic and strong Kleene connectives, e) Stalnaker’s updates rule (i.e. pointwise) and principle for
presupposition felicity (i.e. a sentence is felicitous if it is defined at every point in the context).
With these resources we give a reasonable treatment of presupposition, intersentential anaphora
as well as anaphora across conjunctions. These are the easy cases, however: the challenge will be
to give adequate treatments of negation, disjunctions, quantifiers, and adverbs of quantification.
(One thing to note is that this semantics does not behave well when the same index is reused
by a new quantifier. Different dynamic systems have treated reused indices in different ways.
My attitude is that as there is no empirical evidence that indices are ever reused in natural
language not choose systems on the basis of how they respond to reused indices.)16
9 Negation?
Let us start with negation. The most obvious problem is with the negation of indefinites. Recall
that we wanted pA manx walks inq to be true at a point iff x is a man who walks in at that point.
This is necessary in order that the sentence does the job of satisfying later presuppositions of
variables: the context, once the sentence has been asserted, needs to be one that includes the
fact that x picks out a man who walked in. What about the (wide-scope) negation of pA manx
walks inq? In an empty context this eliminates any world in which any man walks in.
If we’re going to treat truth-value gaps as presupposition-invoking we also need pA manx
walks inq to be true or false everywhere. So, if we stick with a trivalent logic with a strong
Kleene negation we are in a bind, since our truth-conditions have in fact forced our hands with
our falsity-conditions, and these are not what we want. It is exactly these kinds of considerations
which led Heim in her static fragment of chapter 2 to propose an existential closure operation
under negation.
We cannot, of course, simply existentially close all variables, since pronouns do not undergo
existential closure under negation. One option, which we will take here, is to simply existentially
close those variables that are not at risk of causing presupposition failures. There are some
subtleties here, but we will use the following definitions which, with some relatively harmless
auxiliary assumptions, should prove adequate. We will say a sentence φ is definedness-sensitive
to a variable x iff there exists a world w and an assignment function f s.t.JφKfx→⊥,w = # and
for all o, JφKfx→o,w 6= #.17 We say that f ′[φ]f iff f ′ agrees with f on all definedness-sensitive
variables.
16Here I’m in agreement with an unpublished paper by Charlow [2016]. Note also that we can probably
explain why do not generally coindex two indefinite quantifiers by means of a maximize presupposition rule.
17A problem is this: p∃x(x = x ∨ John knows 1+1 = 2)q.
6
A Trivalent Approach to Anaphora and Presupposition Daniel Rothschild
We can now define our dynamic existential closure operator, † as follows:
J†φKf,w =

1 if there is an f ′[φ]f s.t. JφKf ′,w = 1
0 if for all f ′[φ]f , JφKf ′,w = 0
# otherwise
Now, if we have a strong Kleene negation we can treat the negated sentences as follows:
J¬ †A manx walked inKf,w = {1 iff no man in w walked in
0 otherwise
The closure or assertion operator † will prove very useful in many places (including with
disjunctions and under quantifiers), so we need not think of it as merely required for negation.
For now, we will assume it can be freely placed under other operators (at the root level it only
eliminates anaphoric potentials so is not useful).
Moreover, we also now can get anaphora across double negations by not using † at all, e.g.J¬¬A manx walked inK = JA manx walked inK 6= J¬¬ †A manx walked inK
What about J¬ † ¬A manx walked inK? This has the following truth-conditions:
=
{
1 if some man in w walked in
0 otherwise
It simply lacks anaphoric potential.
What about negation without the †-operator: p¬A manx walked inq? While this does suc-
cessfully put conditions on x, it does not ensure that x 6= ⊥. In addition, when asserted in a
context without any variable information it does not put any worldly conditions on the con-
text. We might hope to eliminate such parses on pragmatic grounds, or postulate syntactic
constraints to remove them.
10 Disjunction
10.1 Partee disjunction
We have already seen that our theory accounts naturally for anaphoric connections across
double negations. What about the related question of how the theory accounts for this kind of
disjunction example, due to Partee:
(7) There isn’t a bathroom here, or it’s under the stairs.
We don’t naturally get a coherent reading. For on the parse in (8) the entire sentence will
presuppose that x is assigned.
(8) (¬ † there is a bathroomx ) ∨ (itx’s under the stairs)
It is easy to check that there is no way to place the † operator to yield the desired reading.
However, if we are allowed to insert logically redundant material (in a classical sense), then
we can get the desired reading. Note that from the perspective of propositional logic pφ ∨ ψq
is equivalent to pφ ∨ (¬φ ∧ ψ)q. So from a classical perspective p(¬there is a bathroomx) ∨
(itx’s under the stairs)q is equivalent to p(¬there is a bathroomx ) ∨ (there is a bathroomx ∧
itx’s under the stairs)q. Now if we just add a † operator we get the correct reading: p(¬ †
there is a bathroomx ) ∨ (there is a bathroomx ∧ itx’s under the stairs)q.
What I am proposing is that we can tweak logical forms not only by adding the †-operator,
but also by adding (classically) logically redundant conjunctions. The combination of these two
free operations will then give us the desired readings under disjunctions. Of course, such free
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operations provide a significant divergence between overt syntactic form and that which finally
makes up the meaning, but the proposed operations are sufficiently constrained, I believe, to
be plausible.18
10.2 Stone disjunction
Another aspect of the dynamics of disjunction can be handled in my system without modifica-
tion. Consider disjunctions that can serve as anaphoric antecedents to donkey anaphora:
(9) Either a man will bring a comb or a woman will bring a brush. In either case, ask them
to leave it for me.
One natural suggestion is that the pronouns are linked to both antecedents as follows:19
(10) Either a manx will bring a comby or a womanx will bring a brushy. In either case, ask
themx to leave ity for me.
Stone [1992] posed examples of this general form as a particular problem for dynamic semantics.
What we see, though, is that in our semantics with a simple classical semantics for disjunction
we have no problem with these examples. For any context in which the first sentence is accepted
both x and y will not refer to ⊥ but rather to either a man or woman or a comb or brush,
respectively. Thus, the presuppositions of the pronouns in the second sentence will be satisfied,
yielding the desired interpretation. Again, we see that by using a trivalent semantics without
stipulative accessibility rules we eliminate problems that plague traditional dynamics semantics.
10.3 From disjunction to conditional
Consider this kind of anaphoric connection:
(11) Either it’s a holiday or a customerx will come in. And if it’s not a holiday, hex’ll want
to be served.
To my knowledge, cases such as (11) have not been discussed in the literature, though they
resemble, in some respects, cases of modal subordination. Standard dynamic accounts have no
natural resources to account for them, while e-type approaches can easily treat them since the
presuppositions of a definite description such as pthe customerq is satisfied in the local context
of the consequent of the conditional. Likewise the account I am advocating here naturally
captures such examples since the special presupposition of the pronoun (that x does not pick
out ⊥) is conditionally satisfied once the context is updated with the first disjunct.20
18Kamp and Reyle [1993] also consider adding extra material to the second disjunct to get the desired reading,
but they do not give an explicit system. I am recycling the basic idea from [Rothschild, 2008a] of facilitating
dynamic effects by allowing reconstructions of logical form according to classical equivalence. While I describe
such operations as free here, I believe we will need some constraints on them in order not to generate unattested
readings. The viability of this proposal will ultimately depend on the nature of these constraints.
19Schlenker [2011] gives evidence from sign language that this is the logical form of anaphora with disjunctive
antecedents.
20I make the simplifying assumption here that the conditional in the second sentence is just a material
conditional with strong Kleene semantics.
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11 Quantifiers
With respect to generalized quantifiers such as peveryq we will assume a classical behavior. The
syntactic/semantic assumptions of our quantifiers are relatively simple: a quantifier Qx takes
two arguments of sentential type, which are assumed to contain the free variable x. Qx then
expresses a conservative relationship between the objects satisfying the two arguments (i.e. the
objects that when the assignment function assigns x to those objects makes the arguments
true), as in standard generalized quantifier theory [Barwise and Cooper, 1981].
The critical problem we face is how to understand anaphoric relationships between the
restrictor and matrix of quantifiers. Consider donkey sentences:
(12) Every (man who owns a donkey, beats it)
Given our reformation rules across logical equivalence, these sentences present no problem. For
conservativity ensures that conjoining the restrictor to the matrix in the standard fragment
makes no difference to truth conditions. So we switch the logical form of (12) to (13).
(13) Every († man who owns a donkey, † (man who owns a donkey and beats it))
This gets us what is called the ‘weak’ reading of donkey anaphora, namely that every man who
owns a donkey beats at least one donkey he owns. We will need to avail ourselves of one of
the many strategies in the literature for also obtaining the other reading, but I leave that for
another occasion.21
It is notable that the same technique, using classically equivalent logical forms to cap-
ture anaphoric relations, works for both Partee-disjunction and classic donkey anaphora under
quantifiers.
12 Dynamic adverbs of quantification
As it happens I think the correct treatment of adverbs of quantification requires situational
quantifiers, for roughly the reasons discussed in von Fintel [1994]. However, if we want to
define a Lewisian adverb of quantifier that behaves appropriate for examples like these there
is no technical obstacle. I give a definition in the appendix which follows the usual dynamic
definitions of adverbs of quantifiers as Lewisian [1975] unselective quantifiers.
13 Summary and comparative remarks
Our proposed semantics took a number of important ideas from the literature on dynamic
semantics, particularly Heim’s dissertation.
• Contexts have a Heimian file structure: they are sets of assignment function world/pairs.
• Pronouns and indefinites put conditions on variables.
• There is kind of default existential quantification at the sentence level and under operators
such as negation.
21In my view the weak reading is the right one to get as it is always attested whereas some sentences with
donkey anaphora have no ambiguity:
(i) No man who owns a donkey beats it.
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It is worth comparing this to a dynamic semantics that also covers anaphora and presup-
position. As I noted earlier Beaver’s [2001] ABLE is the obvious comparison point as it covers
presupposition and anaphora (as well as epistemic modals) and builds on much other work in
dynamic semantics from Heim [1982], Kamp [1981] onwards. There are a number of significant
differences between my system and Beaver’s (and other dynamic systems):
My system has semantic values that are functions from assignment world pairs to truth
values. Beaver’s are functions from sets of assignment worlds pairs to sets of assignment worlds
pairs (or relations in type, but he only uses functional relations in his fragment). Beaver’s defi-
nitions of connectives and quantifiers all make reference explicitly to order effects of accessibility
relations. My quantifiers and connectives are simply those from a strong Kleene logic.
On the other hand, my system allows free insertion of †-operators, giving existential closures
as well restricted additions of conjunctives where they do not (classically) affect the truth-
conditions.
My system, in terms of type, is close to that of Dekker [1994, 2012] who also assigns truth-
conditions as semantic values rather than CCPs. However, unlike Dekker, I provide a treatment
of presupposition and have a more classical treatment of quantification and connectives. In my
rigid use of standard (trivalent) quantifier definitions this proposal is in the spirit of Schlenker’s
work on presupposition.
A Syntax
The sets V of variables: x, y, z . . .
Relational predicates, P,R,Q . . .
Where P is a relational predicate and γ1 . . . γn are variables, φ and ψ are arbitrary wff, we form
wff as follows:
P (γ1 . . . γn)|some γ1(φ, ψ)|everyγ1(φ, ψ)|φ ∧ ψ|φ ∨ ψ|¬φ|always(φ, φ)| † φ
B Semantics
Let D be the domain of objects and W be a set of worlds. Let an assignment function be a
function from V to D ∪ ⊥, where ⊥ is a special object not in the domain. An interpretation I
is a mapping from relational predicates and worlds to n-tuples of D. The denotation functionJ·K is a function from a wff, an interpretation, an assignment function and world to the set
{0, 1,#}. (We generally do not refer to the interpretation function, but just refer to predicates
holding in worlds as usual.)
We let f [φ]f ′ iff f agrees with f ′ on all variables x such that there exists a world w and an
assignment function g s.t. JφKgx→⊥,w = # and for all o, JφKgx→o,w 6= #
JP (γ1, . . . γn)Kf,w =

# if any of f(γ1) . . . f(γn) = ⊥
1 iff 〈f(γ1), . . . f(γn)〉 is in the extension of φ at w
0 otherwise
Jφ ∧ ψKf,w =

1 if JφKf,w = 1 and JψKf,w = 1
0 if JφKf,w = 0 or JψKf,w = 0
# otherwise
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Jφ ∨ ψKf,w =

1 if JφKf,w = 1 or JψKf,w = 1




1 if JφKf,w = 0




1 if JφKf,w = 1 and JψKf,w = 1




1 if ∀o ∈ D : JφKfx→o,w = 1 and JψKfx→o,w = 1




1 if ∀f ′[φ]f such that JφKf ′,w = 1,∃f ′′[ψ]f ′ such that JψKf ′′,w = 1




1 if ∃f ′[φ]f such that JφKf ′,w = 1
0 if ∀f ′[φ]f JφKf ′,w = 0
# otherwise
C Transformation mechanisms
In moving from expressed logical forms to the form interpreted we allow the following two
alterations:
†-insertion: Replace any instance of a wff φ inside a wff with †φ
Adding redundant conjunctions: if a wff contains the wffs φ and ψ replace any instance of ψ
with φ∧ψ if the replacement is a classically equivalent.( Definition of classical equivalence:
formulas α and β are classically equivalent if when all † operators are removed for every
interpretation I and assignment function f JφKf,w = 1 iff JψKf,w = 1.)
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